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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/30/2003

On March 28, 2003, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted] UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the Agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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The usual contingent of people from the [redacted] [redacted] were likely in attendance at [redacted]. [redacted] listed the following individuals as possible [redacted] BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]. In addition, individuals from [redacted] may have been in attendance. [redacted] did not recall [redacted]. Pictures may have been taken during the event.

[redacted] did not interact with [redacted] during [redacted] tenure at USAMRIID and did not recall hearing [redacted] name mentioned. [redacted] did not even recognize [redacted] picture when shown in the [redacted]. [redacted] did not have access to [redacted] at USAMRIID.

[redacted] has conducted research strictly in Building [redacted] suites [redacted]. Investigations using virulent strains have been performed by [redacted] in Suites [redacted] areas). [redacted] in addition to work with attenuated strains (bacteria that do not cause disease), have been conducted in Suite [redacted] area). [redacted] as [redacted] has not been properly [redacted] has not witnessed the aerosol challenges conducted in Building [redacted].

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Suites [redacted] have been shared with other individuals in the [redacted] to include the following: [redacted]

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[redacted] BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]

09101.302 SUB 302 - 3538

Investigation on 03/28/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -108 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 03/30/2003

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/28/2003 , Page 2

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] may have been authorized to access [REDACTED] but they did not go into these areas. Since the Fall of 2001, access to Suites B3 and B4 has become more restricted. There is a large lyophilizer in the hallway outside of Suite [REDACTED] in Building 1425. Everyone in the area would notice if it was in use. A lyophilizer is not present in either Suites [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] nor in [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] described [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] If contamination were present in [REDACTED] likely sites would be handles to doors and incubators, in addition to controls of equipment, where there is a high frequency of work conducted with organisms. [REDACTED] does not wear gloves in the change room or offices.

[REDACTED] was given [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] did not handle the envelopes or letters containing the evidentiary *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) materials. The letters arrived at USAMRIID [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] did not witness the handling of the letters, but believes that BRUCE IVINS [REDACTED] worked on a letter in Building 1425, Suite B3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] witnessed IVINS [REDACTED] working with the letter in this area. A chain of custody exists, documenting work conducted on the evidentiary material in Suite B3 [REDACTED] understands from BRUCE IVINS [REDACTED] initiated the cell count conducted in Suite B3.

The conflicting stories over the handling of the Daschle letter are due partly to contamination issues at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] characterized the issue as a problem of perception. The Division feels crucified for contaminating an area. In addition, the questioning of work place practices has been viewed as an attack on personal pride. [REDACTED] believes that the contamination issues have been overly hyped. Improper packaging initially of the Daschle letter may have led to the contamination.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] received [REDACTED] stock of B.a. Ames from BRUCE IVINS. IVINS went back to the original B.a. Ames slant and generated a new stock in order to keep the pathogen as close to the host as possible. IVINS provided his Ames strain to [REDACTED] in the following manner: He retrieved his stock from the freezer, took out a loop and plated it on agar. He then gave the plate to [REDACTED]. In addition to the B.a. Ames stock, [REDACTED] recalled obtaining an spore preparation from IVINS [REDACTED]. This material was generated from IVINS' stock of Ames.

To maintain uniformity of lineage among the laboratory groups working together, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] everyone already had their own Ames stocks. Investigators in the Bacteriology Division used IVINS' Ames stock. [REDACTED] was not sure of the origin of the Ames used by [REDACTED] derived from the original slant. [REDACTED] various B.a. strains [REDACTED] but not Ames.

[REDACTED] does not store much in the way of 'true' Ames stocks or spore preparations. It would be fairly obvious if vials were missing. However, someone could take a loop out without notice. With the small volumes of Ames that [REDACTED] stores, if an appreciable volume was gone, [REDACTED] would notice. [REDACTED] stores numerous stocks of Ames variants. These materials are visually distinct from wild type Ames. 'Normal' Ames appears pale gray, with medusa-like colonies, when plated and is not hemolytic. With aging, the culture becomes grainy and blebs appear. Ames mutants appear yellow in color and display hemolytic activity. If a person did not know better, he might mistake the mutant material as not anthrax.

[REDACTED] has never had a reason to generate a large amount of B.a. Ames spores. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/28/2003, Page 4

[REDACTED] submitted Ames samples remaining from this study to the FBI repository. [REDACTED] recombinant anthrax vaccine study, [REDACTED] was conducted using B.a. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] diagramed the experimental procedure for the Agents. A copy of this diagram is attached and the original is maintained in a 1A envelop (FD-340). [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The vials containing Ames, which still remained after this study, were submitted to the FBI repository. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] typically used [REDACTED]

The investigators at USAMRIID purchase their own supplies. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Large plastic bins are not of practical use for [REDACTED] work in the laboratory. [REDACTED] may use these types of containers for the storage of files at home. Small plastic boxes with gaskets are used for materials that require airtight storage. Steel containers and Styrofoam coolers are used for transport of materials between buildings. [REDACTED] did not recall observing the use of large plastic bins in Building [REDACTED] and was not sure if these containers were used in Building [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/21/2003

On 04/15/2003 SA [ ] accompanied [ ]  
[ ] to [ ] laboratory located in room [ ] of building  
[ ] of the U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS  
DISEASES (USAMRIID) to view [ ] laboratory notebooks.

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In a 3-ring binder labeled [ ]  
[ ] SA [ ] found reference to:

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A *Bacillus anthracis* Ames strain (Ames) spore preparation  
from [ ] produced via [ ]  
was [ ] sporulated at a concentration of [ ]  
[ ] per milliliter (ml) of solution.

A [ ] challenge using Ames spores on  
[ ]

An experiment on [ ] using [ ] purification  
of *Bacillus anthracis* Sterne strain in practice for the  
purification of *Bacillus anthracis* Vollum and Ames strains.

A [ ] protocol on the purification of spores via a  
Renografin density gradient.

A [ ] Ames spore preparation made via [ ]  
sporulation plates.

[ ] and [ ] Ames spore preparations made  
for [ ]  
[ ]

An Ames spore preparation, harvested during [ ]  
[ ] Final  
concentration [ ]

Ames spore preparation for [ ] harvested during  
[ ] purified via [ ] and  
[ ] and combined on [ ] Final concentration [ ]  
[ ]

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by SA [ ] *128*

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/15/2003

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social  
Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted]  
[redacted] work  
telephone [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of  
employment. After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

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[redacted] advised that [redacted] conducted [redacted]  
[redacted]

As part of his [redacted] employment, [redacted] worked at the  
United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious  
Diseases (USAMRIID) under [redacted]  
[redacted] advised that [redacted] worked in the laboratory of  
[redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] was introduced to  
[redacted] at USAMRIID, and in the [redacted]  
was brought into the [redacted]  
eventually given access to the Biosafety Level [redacted] containment  
suite located in Building [redacted] at Fort Detrick. [redacted] was trained  
in suite access by [redacted]

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[redacted] research at [redacted] involved the development of a  
[redacted]  
facilities in Building [redacted] at USAMRIID were used by [redacted] to  
[redacted]

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by [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The [REDACTED] research team working with [REDACTED] at USAMRIID consisted of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that for [REDACTED] using Ba Ames Strain, [REDACTED] did not grow [REDACTED] spores. Initially [REDACTED] obtained a small amount of Ba Ames from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] needed more highly purified Ames Strain spores for [REDACTED] research. [REDACTED] advised that the primary source of BA Ames used in [REDACTED] research was BRUCE IVINS' research group. IVINS provided [REDACTED] [REDACTED] prepared spores contained in a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] would take a small sample of spores from the original [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] kept the [REDACTED] bottle containing [REDACTED] in a safety container which was sealed by a rubber gasket. [REDACTED] stored the [REDACTED] in a drawer in the walk-in refrigerator located on the [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that after the renovation of Building 1412 was complete in the year 2000 or 2001, [REDACTED] kept some [REDACTED] containing deposited Ba Spores in the walk-in refrigerator located on the [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised that before the anthrax mailings some researchers kept their items in the

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/15/2003, Page 3

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refrigerators using "inappropriate" containers such as cardboard boxes. [REDACTED] stated that after the mailings administrative procedures were tightened and the use of cardboard boxes in the refrigerators discontinued.

[REDACTED] stated that when [REDACTED] work at USAMRIID was concluded, [REDACTED] turned over the remainder of [REDACTED] Ba Ames Strain [REDACTED] advised that there is written documentation regarding the transfer of the Ba to [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] never transferred any Ba to any other researcher, nor did [REDACTED] take any Ba out of Building 1412.

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[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] did not know what media was used to grow the Ba Ames Strain which [REDACTED] was given by IVINS' group to conduct [REDACTED] research. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was not immediately aware of the concentration of spores in [REDACTED] but believed that this was documented. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] notebooks are still located in the "hot suite" in Building [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

After the letter containing B.a. spores was recovered from the office of SENATOR THOMAS DASCHLE in September 2001, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has not been asked to participate in any of the forensic research related to the anthrax mailings.

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] left USAMRIID and went to work at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] last name unknown (LNU) worked at USAMRIID [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised that everyone [REDACTED] observed conducting research at USAMRIID practiced good safety procedures in the hot suites. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] would have liked USAMRIID to have



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had better access controls regarding the storage of bacteria and other agents.

[REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] working in the laboratory in [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] also recalled [REDACTED] from the laboratory. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that if one wanted to know what was going on at USAMRIID, they should talk to [REDACTED] employees.

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[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] did remember [REDACTED] telling [REDACTED] about the [REDACTED] working at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED] may be able to provide contact information for [REDACTED]

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Date of transcription 05/28/2003

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] office phone number, [redacted] and  
cell number [redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social  
Security Account Number [redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of  
employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing  
agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the  
following information:

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[redacted] received a [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] A curriculum vitae provided by [redacted] is attached.

[redacted] currently is the [redacted] which is  
involved in the [redacted]

[redacted] the United  
States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)  
from [redacted]  
USAMRIID from [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] continuing education includes but is not limited  
to the following: [redacted]  
[redacted]

Investigation on 05/28/2003 at Frederick, MD  
279A-WF-222936-POI 279A-BA-C101392  
File # 279A-WF-222936-302 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID dictated 05/28/2003  
by [redacted] Postal Inspector: [redacted]  
[redacted] FBI

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140  
copy  
Stamped &  
initialed in  
302 subfile  
Serial  
3238

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/28/2003, Page 2

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[redacted] experience includes [redacted]  
[redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] has an  
[redacted] work, experience, professional organization membership,  
[redacted] which is included in a 1A envelope with  
this report.

[redacted] stated that [redacted]  
[redacted]  
work included vaccine/antibiotics studies and [redacted]  
[redacted] In these studies, [redacted]  
worked with a [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] indicated that USAMRIID [redacted]  
[redacted]  
involved in work on molecular biology of Bacillus anthracis (B.a.).  
[redacted] stated that [redacted] was aware of the utilization of wet spray  
while experimenting with (B.a.). [redacted] stated that other  
individuals, who were involved in molecular work with Ba, included  
[redacted] BRUCE IVINS [redacted]  
[redacted] was not  
aware of any work conducted at USAMRIID utilizing lyophilizers for  
drying (B.a.).

[redacted]  
[redacted] related that [redacted]  
was not aware of any other disgruntle employee's at USAMRIID.

[redacted] related that [redacted] has the expertise to  
weaponize B.a., but [redacted] had not been working in the laboratory

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/28/2003, Page 3

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[REDACTED] at USAMRIID during the time [REDACTED] used [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
These studies often dealt with the weaponization of (B.a.).  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that the Ames strain of B.a. was stored in Suite [REDACTED] in building 1425 at USAMRIID, and that [REDACTED] worked in [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] related that the only security or access problem that [REDACTED] was aware of at USAMRIID was an employee that gained access to a hot suite using another employee's access badge. [REDACTED] could not recall who the employees were, but recalled that the individual/individuals involved in the incident had authorization to be in the hot suites, but forgot his/her access badge. [REDACTED] could not recall any other situation involving improper access to the hot suites.

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[REDACTED] was questioned as to the physical security at USAMRIID and as to any weakness in security that would allow someone to take any biological or chemical agents from the base. [REDACTED] stated that the base had tight controls in place and was partially due to Congress's implementation of the Select Agent Rule prior 1997, whereby controls were implemented to safe guard agents that were to be removed and transferred from facility to facility. These controls included the review and approval of any select agent transfer by the Deputy Commander and the head of security of USAMRIID, [REDACTED] stated that the recently adopted Patriot Act also tightened controls on the transfer of select agents.

[REDACTED] opined that the Ames strain used in the Anthrax mailings could have come from USAMRIID, but [REDACTED] believed that it would not have been taken from USAMRIID in a dry form. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] believes a person would have had to have taken a small amount of B.a. Ames, and would have had to grow the B.a. on their own. [REDACTED] said that they could grow it using a blood agar and washing it with water three to five times. [REDACTED] related in order to achieve a high quality the spores could be washed up to fifteen times. [REDACTED] stated that in order to dry B.a., solvent methods could

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/28/2003, Page 4

be utilized rather than another drying process. In this way, the B.a. would not have to be milled to achieve a powder form. [REDACTED] related that as soon as B.a. is dried it is a highly dangerous substance.

[REDACTED] theorized that it is possible for one person to be responsible for the mailings but [REDACTED] would not discount that the mailings were State sponsored terrorism. [REDACTED] then related that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that Clorox would be sprayed on to decontaminate Class I and Class II bio-safety cabinets. Paraformaldehyde fumigation was also part of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) at USAMRIID in the decontamination process. [REDACTED] stated that usage of glutaraldehyde, as a decontamination agent, was limited and was not utilized in the suites as it was too dangerous. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] the decontamination efforts at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] had not known [REDACTED] very well at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was questioned as to [REDACTED] involvement with [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] could not recall any other specific information regarding [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] requested to end the interview before questioned had been concluded, as [REDACTED] needed to respond to some incoming phone

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calls.  was agreeable to conclude the interview at a future date.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/30/2003

On May 29, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] was  
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone [redacted] by Special  
Agents (SAs) [redacted] After being  
advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the  
purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

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[redacted] earned a [redacted] degree in [redacted]  
[redacted] UNIVERSITY in [redacted] and immediately began  
working at [redacted]  
initial work involved materials research and during [redacted] tenure at  
[redacted] earned a [redacted] degree in [redacted]

In [redacted] assisted with the [redacted]

[redacted] began interacting  
with the UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF  
INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID) in [redacted] USAMRIID personnel supplied  
biological agents used for development and testing [redacted]

[redacted] was the main point of contact at USAMRIID and  
[redacted]

[redacted] completed USAMRIID'S immunization  
program and worked in room [redacted] of Building [redacted]  
recalled that initial work was conducted [redacted]  
[redacted] Sample handling and preparation were not conducted  
in a biosafety containment suite, as the biological agents used in  
testing, such as [redacted] were not  
"hot". [redacted] provided and handled these materials

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Investigation on 05/29/2003 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

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and stored them in an upright, glass-door refrigerator in room [REDACTED]. On occasion, [REDACTED] would pipet small volumes of liquid material from vials onto [REDACTED]. After use, all samples and materials were decontaminated, either chemically or in the autoclave. [REDACTED] primary function was [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] maintained a variable on-site schedule, working at USAMRIID one day a week, or less.

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While [REDACTED] was employed with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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During [REDACTED] completed the immunization program and became [REDACTED] scientist for the sample handling aspects of the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Collaboration [REDACTED] interacted with [REDACTED] develop and refine a technique for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] work was conducted with *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames. The B.a. Ames spores were supplied in liquid form by BRUCE IVINS of USAMRIID and were stored in a refrigerator in room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] with the assistance of [REDACTED] used a hood line in room [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] assisted [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] work on the project as [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/29/2003, Page 3

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] foremost responsibility was [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The majority of [REDACTED] work [REDACTED]  
containing captured *B.a.* Ames spores was conducted during [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] time frame. [REDACTED]

handled [REDACTED] but not the raw *B.a.* Ames spore material. [REDACTED] recalled holding the container of *B.a.* spores and looking at the material in the biosafety hood on one occasion. Prior to [REDACTED] *B.a.* Ames spores were stored on a small shelf in the room [REDACTED] walk-in cooler. [REDACTED] accessed this walk-in refrigerator in Building [REDACTED] and indicated that the area was packed with various materials. [REDACTED] recalled seeing racks of tubes and plastic boxes with lids; however, [REDACTED] did not look around too much. Once analyzed in [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] bleached to chemically deactivate the spores.

[REDACTED] worked at USAMRIID initially as a [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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access to the [REDACTED] suites. The biocabinet housing [REDACTED] was shared with [REDACTED] however, the work conducted by [REDACTED] at USAMRIID was not related to [REDACTED] hands-on work in the laboratory was sporadic, as [REDACTED] primary function was that of [REDACTED] did not know the specifics of the research conducted by [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] current studies involve collaboration with USAMRIID personnel.

The [REDACTED] using *B.a.* Ames were completed and the project was scheduled to continue using additional biological agents. [REDACTED] anticipated the set-up of this [REDACTED] at USAMRIID within the month. The project has been dormant of late, however, as

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/29/2003, Page 4

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ believed that the project will proceed as funding, \_\_\_\_\_ has been provided to USAMRIID for continued contributions to the project. \_\_\_\_\_ will supposedly replace \_\_\_\_\_ will continue to provide the \_\_\_\_\_ expressed doubts as to the feasibility of this arrangement.

\_\_\_\_\_ identified all of \_\_\_\_\_ work areas at USAMRIID on a floor plan provided by the Agents. The floor plan shown to \_\_\_\_\_ is maintained in a 1A envelope (FD-340). \_\_\_\_\_ was in USAMRIID Building \_\_\_\_\_ to access the \_\_\_\_\_ but \_\_\_\_\_ did not conduct laboratory work in this building.

\_\_\_\_\_ has never meet \_\_\_\_\_ heard \_\_\_\_\_  
Aside from \_\_\_\_\_ and USAMRIID personnel directly involved in the \_\_\_\_\_ did not interact with USAMRIID employees. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled seeing \_\_\_\_\_ and individuals working in neighboring laboratory spaces.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/09/2003

On May 8, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] was  
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted]

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[redacted] by Special Agents (SAs) [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the Agents, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

[redacted] has been working at [redacted]  
[redacted] for approximately [redacted] Prior to [redacted] was a

[redacted] When the project was initiated, [redacted] was  
the [redacted] Funding was  
provided by [redacted] as the original [redacted]  
[redacted] wanted to extend the study to the analysis of real  
[redacted] rather than just simulants; thus, [redacted] contacted [redacted]  
at the ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES  
(USAMRIID). [redacted] funded USAMRIID'S contributions to the project,  
as [redacted] could not provide funding to the military. A Memorandum of  
Understanding was drafted between [redacted] and USAMRIID designating  
the Institute as the provider of biological agents for use in  
developing [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] to conduct studies at USAMRIID for the project. They  
completed the vaccination series and began to work with [redacted]  
[redacted] Multiple biological agents were  
used in the studies, including [redacted] and *Bacillus*  
*anthracis* (B.a.). [redacted] both with [redacted]  
[redacted] backgrounds, did not grow any of the biological agents  
for the studies.

[redacted] was hired by USAMRIID at  
[redacted] prompting to assist [redacted] with the project. [redacted] had  
the background necessary to [redacted] and may have supplied

Investigation on 05/08/2003 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/08/2003, Page 2

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biological samples internally to personnel at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] did not grow [REDACTED] used in the studies, rather [REDACTED] interfaced with a person growing the virus in [REDACTED] group at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] received samples from [REDACTED] who assisted significantly with sample handling. [REDACTED] also [REDACTED] for use in the project.

In addition to supplying [REDACTED] samples for the project, [REDACTED] provided training to [REDACTED] laboratory protocols in a [REDACTED] received initial [REDACTED] training from [REDACTED] of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] spent no more than 40 hours in the [REDACTED] spent a little more time than [REDACTED]

Initially, a commercial mass spectrometer was used to obtain the biological signatures of myriad agents. An organism in liquid form was deposited on a slide. Once dry, the slide was inserted into the instrument sample compartment for analysis. These measurements were made in [REDACTED] laboratory space.

Extension of the project, to include [REDACTED] required the construction of a [REDACTED] Once [REDACTED] was taken to USAMRIID for testing. [REDACTED] laboratory was used to conduct the aerosol work. [REDACTED] group worked with [REDACTED] laboratory personnel, mainly [REDACTED] Agents were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] worked mainly with *Bacillus anthracis*. BRUCE IVINS provided [REDACTED] with a tube of liquid *B.a.* Ames spores at a concentration of  $\sim 10^{12}$  cfu/mL. [REDACTED] did not know the specifics of how the spores were grown, but recalled that the material was gradient purified using renograph. No additives were used to enhance the properties of the spores. The Ames spore preparation was stored in the [REDACTED] walk-in cooler in the containment facility of Building [REDACTED] The tape samples containing deposited agents were stored in a Tupperware container in the same location. [REDACTED] did not recall the maintenance of a log or inventory for the walk-in cooler. [REDACTED] was aware of the location and types of

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/08/2003, Page 3

samples [REDACTED] group was storing. [REDACTED] did not know what other materials were stored in the cooler. The cooler was accessible to anyone with authorization to enter the hot area of Building [REDACTED]

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The tapes containing biological agents were autoclaved and discarded after use. A total of ~50 sample tapes were made for the project. [REDACTED] was designated as the caretaker of the remaining B.a. Ames spores when [REDACTED] left USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] conducted very limited work with the B.a. Ames, aside from [REDACTED] assisted with a [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has never met [REDACTED] did not hang around USAMRIID outside of [REDACTED] laboratory work and knew [REDACTED] individuals at the Institute, including [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] could not recall [REDACTED] response. [REDACTED] did not attend any [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not meet [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not recall discussions with [REDACTED] regarding what countries had weaponized anthrax. Medical and environmental biological samples may have been discussed, as scientists often culture isolates from dead animals to obtain diverse strains for assay development.

[REDACTED] did not believe, for several reasons, that the anthrax mailings were performed by a terrorist organization. The mailer did not capitalize on the advantage gained after the first mailings by sending additional letters. The odd pattern indicated to [REDACTED] that the mailer ran out of agent, which would be unlikely for a terrorist group capable of manufacturing a large amount of material.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/08/2003, Page 4

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[redacted] prior to working with [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] left USAMRIID for a job at the [redacted] has worked at the [redacted] for approximately [redacted] one or two people formerly at USAMRIID, [redacted]

[redacted] has continued to work at [redacted] [redacted] will be taken to USAMRIID for studies using biological agents. [redacted] will use the same B.a. Ames spore preparation used initially by [redacted] [redacted] trained personnel will also help run the samples.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/28/2003

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] social security number [redacted] home  
address [redacted] home  
telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of  
employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of  
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, work  
telephone number [redacted] After being advised of the  
identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] and has been  
employed at USAMRIID since [redacted] received a degree  
[redacted] University.

[redacted]  
[redacted] work at USAMRIID is  
mostly conducted in the [redacted] gained suite access in  
[redacted] also has access to the hot suites and [redacted] has  
participated in aerosol challenges. [redacted] was not positive if [redacted]  
ever handled Bacillus anthracis (BA). [redacted] stated the last time  
[redacted] believed [redacted] handled anthrax was in [redacted]  
received a pipet of a solution from BRUCE IVINS which [redacted] spread on  
agar plates. [redacted] believed the solutions were anthrax and does  
not know the type of strain.

[redacted] does not maintain a diary or log concerning [redacted]  
work. [redacted] does not use a lyophilizer and has never dried  
anthrax. [redacted] does not use sterilite containers and does not  
recall seeing these type of containers at USAMRIID. [redacted] does  
not know where anthrax is stored but guessed it would be in the [redacted]  
suite. [redacted] does not know of anyone who could be associated with  
the anthrax mailings.

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[redacted] uses the walk in cooler on the [redacted] near  
[redacted] in building [redacted] to store vials of serum. [redacted]  
never witnessed anyone " piggy back" in and out of the hot/suites,  
and could not recall if [redacted] had ever saw foreign visitors enter the  
hot suites.

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July 25, 2003 Fort Detrick, Maryland [redacted] 302

Investigation on [redacted] at [redacted]

65-1279A-WF-222936USAMRIID 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] 302-914

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Date dictated July 27, 2003

by U.S. POSTAL INSPECTOR [redacted]  
U.S. POSTAL INSPECTOR [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ] , On July 25, 2002, Page 2

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[ ] has not been contacted by anyone trying to obtain anthrax or anything else from USAMRIID. [ ] does not use or purchase pre-stamped envelopes and has not/seen any at USAMRIID.

[ ] does not personally know [ ] and has never met [ ] never saw [ ] at USAMRIID.

[ ] has no friends or associates who reside in New Jersey. [ ] believes [ ] during the dates of the anthrax mailings. [ ] provided agents copies of [ ] employee time sheets records.

Copies of [ ] time sheet records are enclosed in a 1A envelope.



This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted] in the -70 degree Celsius freezer located in the Suite [redacted] hallway, and in the refrigerator in Room [redacted] and a freezer log

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/22/2003, Page 4

is maintained which contains such information as who the material belongs to and where it originated from.

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[redacted] autoclaves any extra *B.a.* Ames spores on the same day of the study in which it was used, with the exception of when the autoclave is down for maintenance. [redacted] has never shared any *B.a.* Ames spore preparations. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] has never worked with [redacted] and [redacted] had no knowledge of a mock dry *B.a.* Ames experiment [redacted]

[redacted] stored media plates in the Room [redacted] cold room, and never saw any *B.a.* Ames stored in there. [redacted] never saw [redacted] near Room [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/16/2003

On May 13, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] was  
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army  
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted]  
Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]  
After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose  
of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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In addition to [redacted]  
created for SA [redacted] Baltimore FBI; [redacted]

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[redacted] agreed to locate a copy of the [redacted]  
[redacted] for the agents.

[redacted] worked in some capacity with [redacted]  
[redacted] recollection of [redacted] work with the [redacted] the  
individuals present, and [redacted]

[redacted] had limited contact with [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] was not present for the [redacted]

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[redacted] advised that USAMRIID received very little  
material from the Brokaw letter, only two to three "grains". The  
New York FBI office first sent the letter to the Centers for  
Disease Control (CDC), and the FBI then moved the letter from the  
CDC to USAMRIID. USAMRIID was advised not to do any work with the  
letter until given further notice, and it was stored at room  
temperature in Room [redacted] in a locked cabinet. [redacted] thinks

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Investigation on 05/13/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland


by SA [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-302-3130

Date dictated N/A

SSA [redacted]

by SA [redacted]



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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/13/2003, Page 2

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that one "grain" of the B.a. was removed and sent for EM. A swab of the envelope was taken for culture purposes.

USAMRIID held the Leahy letter in storage and did not do any work with it for an extended period of time. The letter remained in the original plastic can in which it was received, with the evidence tape still intact. During this time, there were numerous meetings about how the letter should be handled, and a protocol was written outlining the exact steps to be taken. In addition, a room in Suite [REDACTED] was being set up to work the Leahy letter in accordance with the established protocol.

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[REDACTED] was moved into Suite [REDACTED] to be used for work with the Leahy letter. This [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] volunteered the use of [REDACTED] in response to a canvass of USAMRIID requesting one.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From the time the Leahy letter was opened, the two person team rule was put into effect from that point forward. Once the doors to Rooms [REDACTED] were double secured, the stored letters were moved there from Room [REDACTED].

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/13/2003, Page 3

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[REDACTED] advised that things were handled in a different manner at the time the Daschle letter was received at USAMRIID, and many lessons were learned from their work with the letter.

Personnel from the United States Capitol Police (USCP) and the FBI transported several packages to USAMRIID, one of which contained the Daschle letter. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] At that time, it was unclear which of letters was the source of the B.a. contamination, as several letters had been packaged together in ziploc bags. There were many people present in [REDACTED] at the time Daschle letter was being in-processed.

The analysis of the Daschle letter began immediately upon its arrival. One container had two bottles of fluid from a preliminary hand-held analysis of the letter after it was opened in the Hart Senate Office Building. Some of this fluid was removed and sent for Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) analysis and to [REDACTED]

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After being told by the USCP that the packaging had been decontaminated, the can containing the ziploc bags was opened just enough to take some photographs in [REDACTED]. The ziploc bags containing the letters were not opened and the Daschle letter itself was never opened in Room [REDACTED]. Although at that time, the policy at USAMRIID did not prohibit opening items received for analysis inside of a hood in a Biosafety Level (BL) 2 laboratory, none of the four letters were ever opened in [REDACTED]

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The letters were then moved to Suite [REDACTED] Room [REDACTED] and placed into separate ziploc bags. These bags were probably obtained from Room [REDACTED] in Suite [REDACTED]

The FBI and USPIS wanted additional photographs of the Daschle letter taken immediately, [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/13/2003, Page 5

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was aware that BRUCE IVINS performed a concentration count on some material from the Daschle letter in Suite B3, and thought that some material had been removed from the letter and given to IVINS for that purpose. When the agents advised [REDACTED] of a handwritten chain of custody indicating that [REDACTED] signed the letter over to IVINS [REDACTED] for the concentration determination, [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Prior to the irradiation of the Daschle letter, a quick study was done to determine if the process would have an effect on any fingerprints that might have been present. After the Daschle letter was irradiated and a sterility check was performed, the letter was photographed. [REDACTED] thinks that the Daschle letter was gamma irradiated [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] some people from each Division within USAMRIID have been trained to irradiate materials. All four letters were irradiated in Room [REDACTED] and photographed in Room [REDACTED] are located in a suite belonging to the [REDACTED]

The B.a. from the New York Post letter was granular and appeared to be a number of different colors. When B.a. is centrifuged, it appears to be brown at the bottom of the tube, tan in the middle, and a lighter color or white at the top of the tube. If the material is left to dry in the tube and then ground up, it would appear to be different colors. With regard to the New York Post and Brokaw material, [REDACTED] thinks that the mailer either did not know how to do the final purification step or that they pulled the wrong tube of material to use first. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 05/13/2003, Page 6

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and others at the Washington Field Office that [REDACTED] thinks the source of the anthrax in the mailings was domestic, as an international source would not use "crappy material" for the New York Post and Brokaw letters.

[REDACTED] thinks that the Daschle and Leahy material was more granular when it was placed in the envelopes and that it became more powdered from being passed through the machinery in the postal system. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Prior to the receipt of the Daschle letter, the Special Pathogens Sample Test Laboratory (SPSTL) had a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for receiving and opening threat letters. This SOP included a flow chart of how to process a letter and called for the preparation of a wet mount and culture of the material. The employees were taught that they could work with the sample safely at the [REDACTED] level until the nature of the material was determined. This SOP has been modified because of the fall 2001 anthrax mailings. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] work space at USAMRIID includes: Building [REDACTED]  
Rooms [REDACTED] and Building [REDACTED] Suite [REDACTED] Rooms [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/13/2003, Page 7

[REDACTED] He also used Building [REDACTED] Room [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]Prior to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] only vaguely remembers [REDACTED] at  
USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not recall ever seeing [REDACTED] near the Room [REDACTED]  
walk in cooler in Building [REDACTED]

All of [REDACTED] are stored in  
Building [REDACTED] Rooms [REDACTED] In addition, there may be [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] B.a. Ames spore preparations could have been removed  
from the Room [REDACTED] walk in cooler without being missed, as they were  
not keeping track of sample volumes. Some of the tubes were  
labeled as B.a. Ames spores and were stored in a 1% phenol and  
water solution for a long time. [REDACTED] did not know where the  
Suites [REDACTED] spore preps were stored.

It is very likely that the difference in purity of the  
powder between the two mailings could be explained by someone  
having taken several tubes of B.a. Ames which were from different  
batches with different levels of purity. [REDACTED] said this to  
either ADIC Harp or SSA [REDACTED] previously.

The Dugway B.a. that was made at the FBI'S request is  
different material from the purified Dugway spores used by IVINS in  
aerosol challenges. The former Dugway B.a. was weighed out in Room  
[REDACTED] after its receipt. [REDACTED] IVINS did not handle  
or weigh the material. Prior to the anthrax mailings, the only  
Dugway B.a. at USAMRIID was that maintained and used by IVINS.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/13/2003, Page 8

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Any *B.a.* containing both plasmids grows very well in New Sporulation Medium (NSM). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

There has been an exchange of *B.a.* Ames spore preps and anthrax vaccine between USAMRIID and Porton Down. This has been in an effort to answer some questions about the vaccine and about differences between strains. The *B.a.* Ames spore preps sent to Porton Down were probably from the IVINS strain rather than the [REDACTED] strain.

[REDACTED] identified the following individuals as those who [REDACTED] IVINS, [REDACTED] spore preps are mostly used to study toxin production, [REDACTED] advised that there are other people that [REDACTED] is not aware of who produce *B.a.* spores.

[REDACTED] has never lyophilized any live *B.a.* spores. From approximately [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had a binder containing the records for all of the [REDACTED] which [REDACTED] provided to the agents. [REDACTED] was given an FD-597 Property Receipt in exchange for the binder. [REDACTED] may also have some older notebooks containing similar data. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] hand receipt. One is a large Virtis model located in Building 1425, Room [REDACTED] It was previously used by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/13/2003, Page 9

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[REDACTED] The other is located in [REDACTED] of Suite [REDACTED] and has not been used by [REDACTED]. This lyophilizer was located near the Virology Division for a time. [REDACTED] aware that another lyophilizer was located in a room across the hall from Room [REDACTED] although [REDACTED] is not the hand receipt holder for this item.

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The lyophilizer in Room [REDACTED] can be accessed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It has been located in Room [REDACTED] since its purchase, and it has never been in a hot area.

[REDACTED] was trying to find the lyophilizer that is currently located in the hallway outside of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] may have been the individual who notified [REDACTED] of the location of the lyophilizer.

[REDACTED] advised that this particular [REDACTED] could have been accessed by anyone, as opposed to all others which were kept behind locked doors. There were no shelves in this lyophilizer, as it can only be used for bottles. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has never used the lyophilizer and does not know why [REDACTED] but it was likely bought for use in a project [REDACTED] does not know who has had access to the [REDACTED] nor whether it has ever been in a hot area.

[REDACTED] advised that in order to dry spores safely, without concern about containment, an individual could use [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that this is common knowledge to most people who know anything

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/13/2003, Page 10

about lyophilization, and further advised that the technology involved has not changed much.

If material was teased away from the bottle after being dried, there would be very little aerosolization. B.a. would not become clumpy from being lyophilized, rather it would be very "loose". [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, "crappy" material might become clumpy from lyophilization. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of a pulmonary anthrax sample from South Africa. Sometimes when such a sample was received at USAMRIID, they would only get a portion of it without any accompanying information. Such a sample probably would have gone to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] agreed to look through any binders of [REDACTED] work for a mention of any such sample. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] might also have some knowledge of the sample, as [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] at that time. [REDACTED] was not working [REDACTED] during the time frame that the sample was received.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/13/2003, Page 11

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[REDACTED] had no recollection of any human serology samples from South Africa. In reference to samples [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised that if those samples had been in-processed, there would be a record of them. There were a lot of human serology samples received as part of Operation Desert Storm. These samples were taken from members of the Republican Guard as they were captured in order to determine what vaccinations they had received. [REDACTED] would be the individuals who would have knowledge of any serology samples.

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[REDACTED] could not think of anyone who had reason to send the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] thinks that whomever was responsible for the mailings had something to be gained by doing so, such as financial gain. Someone may have had an investment, or been part of a company, that would benefit from the mailings. Or, they could have been trying to obtain funding for a related project.

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The individual responsible may have thought that people were not taking the threat of bioterrorism seriously enough and wanted to draw attention and emphasis to the matter. The person may have tried to take advantage of the events of September 11, 2001, or perhaps there was a connection between the two.

When [REDACTED] thought about whether there were any people unethical enough to do such a thing, [REDACTED] came to [REDACTED] mind quickly, [REDACTED]

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The FBI started an investigation of the incident, but it was subsequently dropped.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/13/2003, Page 12

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b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B.a. Ames is now present all over the world as it is considered the standard. Prior to Ames, everyone used B.a. Stearne or B.a. Vollum. [REDACTED] had very little knowledge of South Africa's program during the 1980s. [REDACTED] advised that Ames has been shipped to England and that the British could have sent it as they have a lot of contacts.

[REDACTED] has never had anything other than a professional relationship with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] took the agents to see the lyophilizer located outside of Suite [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that a person could walk out of the suite and use the lyophilizer.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After lyophilization, most of the material will remain at the bottom of the bottle. If someone used a piece of glassware to lyophilize B.a., they could leave it to be autoclaved without being discovered. [REDACTED] did not know where [REDACTED] desk was located, or whether [REDACTED] had any lyophilizer bottles at [REDACTED] desk.

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If contaminated mail made its way out into the general public, [REDACTED] wherein [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/02/2003

On March 28, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] did not work directly with any of the evidentiary material from the fall 2001 anthrax mailings. [redacted]

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[redacted] hot work space is in Suite [redacted] and [redacted] cold work space is Room [redacted]. All of [redacted] work with *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) is conducted in [redacted]. [redacted] usually puts on gloves immediately upon entering the laboratory and wears them the entire time [redacted] is working there. [redacted] probably does not wear gloves when [redacted] handles the telephone or door handles. [redacted]

From [redacted] did a fair number of [redacted]

[redacted] advised that this protocol is almost like a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) at USAMRIID and provided the Agents with a copy of the protocol which is included in the 1A envelope.

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[redacted] has been using the [redacted]

[redacted] recall ever using an agar medium to grow Ames. Most of the people [redacted] at USAMRIID also use liquid broth to grow B.a.

[redacted] advised that some strains of B.a. do not sporulate well in broth. Weaker strains of B.a. that are lacking in plasmids

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Investigation on 03/28/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 3752  
File # 279A-WF-222936-302 279A-BA-C101392

Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]  
by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/28/2003, Page 2

need to be grown on agar. [REDACTED] developed a protocol using New Sporulation Medium (NSM), an agar medium, some years ago. [REDACTED] has used NSM to grow some B.a. strains, but not Ames.

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When [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Small cardboard boxes are used to store the ampules in the freezer.

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[REDACTED] obtained [REDACTED] original Ames stock from BRUCE IVINS, and has never used [REDACTED] has also used some of the Dugway Ames spores which she obtained from IVINS.

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[REDACTED] does not usually share spore preparations with others. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has provided challenge inoculum to IVINS [REDACTED]

Prior to the start of a challenge, the Bacteriology investigator providing the B.a. for the inoculum would streak some of the material on plates in order to determine the spore concentration. After the challenge is completed, a sample of the air that the animal inhaled is sent to the same investigator to be plated. The Bacteriology investigator then sends these results to the Aerobiology investigator, who uses a formula incorporating the animal's breathing rate to determine how much B.a. the animal actually inhaled. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has not mailed any B.a. outside of USAMRIID in years. [REDACTED] would notice if there were any vials missing [REDACTED] Ames stock.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/28/2003, Page 3

There is one lyophilizer in Suite B5, a Biosafety Level (BSL) 2 area. There are no lyophilizers in the [REDACTED] containment suites. [REDACTED] is not aware of any small or bench size lyophilizers. [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] and never saw [REDACTED] near any [REDACTED] lab space.

[REDACTED] has never heard of any bacteriological contamination of [REDACTED] Division lab space. A survey of USAMRIID was done approximately one year ago and no contamination was found. A survey was conducted of the [REDACTED] Division lab space and nothing has been found recently. Surveys inside of the Bacteriology hot suites are conducted approximately once per week to check decontamination efficiency.

Only individuals assigned to the [REDACTED] can use [REDACTED] and less people have access to the division's lab space than did previously. People from other divisions now need an escort to enter [REDACTED] whereas they previously did not. Even when access to [REDACTED] was less restricted, people did not wander in and out of these areas.

Most investigators have their own research budgets to purchase supplies. [REDACTED] laboratory supplies, including such things as ziplocs, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] The people in charge of logistics buy some supplies, such as shampoo for the showers, from commercial stores.

[REDACTED] does not use any large plastic containers for storage or transport of materials. Some plastic autoclave pans that are laying around [REDACTED] lab are used to carry some materials. These pans are not as deep as a plastic box.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/13/2003

On 08/13/2003, [redacted]  
social security account number: [redacted] date of birth: [redacted]  
[redacted] home address: [redacted]  
[redacted] home telephone number: [redacted] provided  
[redacted] Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Washington Field Office, with correspondence that detailed the  
following:

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(1) a list of [redacted] coworkers at USAMRIID., comprising  
[redacted] Bruce E.  
Ivins, Ph.D.; [redacted]  
[redacted]

(2) other USAMRIID staff with whom [redacted] collaborated  
on Bacillus anthracis studies to include [redacted]  
[redacted]

(3) a description of [redacted]  
[redacted] two  
research contracts USAMRIID funded on development of a vaccine for  
Ba; and a description of [redacted]  
[redacted] research contract USAMRIID funded on  
development of a Ba vaccine;

(4) [redacted]  
[redacted] concerning [redacted]  
[redacted] lecture at USAMRIID on [redacted]  
[redacted]

(5) USAMRIID's standard experimental procedures used for  
the production of Ba Ames spores (dated 07/21/1986);

(6) a USAMRIID Disposition Form, dated [redacted] from  
[redacted] establishing  
operating procedures in [redacted] for the storage  
and handling of virulent Ba strains [redacted]  
[redacted]

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Investigation on 08/13/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-POI; 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/13/2003, Page 2

(7) USAMRIID's standard operating procedure, dated 04/25/1984, for the maintenance of Ba isolates, and USAMRIID's Memorandum 55-3, dated 10/21/1980, addressing the transportation and travel shipment of etiologic agents. In particular, this memorandum specifies that supply of etiologic agents to investigators outside of USAMRIID requires the approval of the Commander or his designated representatives. The Commander, USAMRIID, must approve all requests for shipment of Hazard Group 4 and 5 agents, all foreign requests, and shipments to persons not institutionally affiliated with USAMRIID.

The original correspondence with enclosures is filed in a 1A (FD-340) envelope. A complete copy is attached to this FD-302.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

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